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Abstract 
This paper examines individuals’ preferences for multiple jobholding (moonlighting) 
and relates this to characteristics of hypothetical primary and secondary jobs using a 
discrete choice experiment. This is a novel approach to this issue that overcomes the 
limitations of existing studies that solely rely upon observed moonlighting behaviour, 
and allows us to investigate the relative importance of competing theoretical 
explanations of moonlighting. We find that individuals have multiple jobs to respond 
to financial constraints, and that individuals are attracted to second jobs that allow 
them to develop new skills, which they may later use to move to a different career 
pathway.  
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What Triggers Multiple Job-holding?  
A Stated Preference Investigation 
1. Introduction 
In this paper we focus on individuals’ willingness to hold a second job and study their 
labour supply decisions when presented with various hypothetical employment 
scenarios. There has been to date very little empirical analysis of why individuals 
moonlight because of a lack of data suitable for answering this question. We use the 
term “moonlighting” liberally to refer to multiple job-holding, without making any 
implications regarding the legitimacy or the time the described actions take place.  
Large micro datasets ask respondents whether they have a second job, but no dataset 
explicitly gathers information on why individuals choose to hold more than one job. 
Most datasets focus on revealed preference data and only report second job 
characteristics for individuals who moonlight. But there are three reasons why an 
individual will not moonlight and each reason implies a different individual labour 
supply decisions. These decisions cannot be separately distinguished using existing 
micro datasets: (1) Individuals are not interested in moonlighting, (2) Individuals would 
like to moonlight, but they cannot find a second job with attractive features, and (3) 
Individuals would like to moonlight but they cannot find employment. Furthermore, 
there are two reasons why an individual cannot find employment in a second job and 
another individual can. First, observed moonlighters may be more informed or more 
engaged in the job market, which allows them to identify job opportunities, or they 
could be more aggressive in their job search. Second, multiple-job-holding is the 
outcome of a two-step process: an individual queues for a second job, and the employer 
hires the individual from a pool of applicants. Moonlighters and non-moonlighters may 
also differ in their employability. 
We focus on the individual’s decision to moonlight and relate this to (hypothetical) 
characteristics of the primary job and second job using a form of conjoint analysis, a 
discrete choice experiment (DCE). This stated preference method elicits individuals 
preferences for different multiple job combinations. This approach allows us to 
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investigate the relative importance of competing theoretical explanations for 
moonlighting. The advantage of this our approach is that it considers all individuals 
whereas the majority of the literature constrains its attention to only those who are 
observed holding a second job. This is a novel approach to this issue that overcomes the 
limitations of the existing studies that solely rely upon second-job searches that are 
successful.  
Data are from primary data collection using a survey of individuals who are employed 
in the U.K. North Sea oil and gas industry. These workers are chosen because their jobs 
are characterised by strict hours constraints in a risky work environment. This will help 
us identify the various motives for holding a second job. Second jobs can help 
individuals overcome labour supply constraints (Conway and Kimmel, 1998), therefore 
offshore workers who face restrictions in their working hours may view multiple job-
holding as a way to overcome this constraint and increase their labour income. 
Furthermore, individuals who may be wishing to reduce their exposure to workplace 
risk may use a second job as a means of learning new skills that will enable them to 
move to an alternative career pathway (Guariglia and Kim, 2006; Panos et al, 2014).  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background of 
moonlighting and reviews empirical studies on multiple-job-holding. Section 3 discusses 
methods of data collection, Section 4 presents and discusses the results and Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Theory and Literature 
The standard theoretical framework assumes that an individual’s labour supply 
decisions on both the primary and secondary jobs are based on utility-maximising 
behaviour. An hours-constrained worker does not work sufficient hours on his primary 
job to reach the level of income that optimises his utility. For the hours-constrained 
worker, primary job hours are no longer a choice variable, and the only avenue for 
working more hours is to take a second job (Conway and Kimmel, 1998). Therefore, in 
response to an employer’s inability to offer enough hours on the primary job, the 
individual may choose to moonlight in order to achieve his desired income level. In this 
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case, an individual moonlights because he cannot work as many hours as he would like 
on his primary job.  
Early empirical research investigating moonlighting primarily focused on the hours 
constrained motivation. Early descriptive studies such as Hamel (1967) Guthrie (1969) 
find that the level of a worker’s earnings determines his propensity to moonlight with 
the incidence of moonlighting declining as the level of earnings rises, and that 
moonlighting serves primarily to improve living standards, respectively. The first 
theoretical and empirical treatment of moonlighting was carried out by Shishko and 
Rostker (1976) who suggest that the supply of labour to a second job fell with primary 
job earnings. Krishnan (1990) also finds that longer hours and higher income on the 
primary job deters moonlighting, adding further support to the hours constraints 
motive for moonlighting. 
Apart from the hours constraints motive, the literature has identified some additional 
motives for moonlighting. The heterogeneous jobs explanation of moonlighting 
recognises that individuals who do not face an hours-constraint on their primary job 
may also choose to work a second job. By definition, non-constrained moonlighters are 
those employees who could work more hours on the primary job if they wished to. 
Moonlighting arises because the hours of labour supplied to the two jobs are not 
perfect substitutes. Individuals will choose to moonlight for reasons not connected to 
primary job hours or earnings. For example, an individual may have a second job to 
learn about new occupations or gain credentials and experience; to engage in activities 
that interest them; to gain job satisfaction not received from the primary job; to insure 
against job insecurity; or to maintain flexible work schedules. 
 More recent research has investigated alternative moonlighting motives. For instance, 
the dynamics of moonlighting are investigated by Kimmel and Conway (2001) for the 
U.S. and Böheim and Taylor (2004) for Great Britain. They find evidence of multiple 
motives for moonlighting, with the hours constraints motive being the most common. 
Böheim and Taylor find that moonlighting is persistent over time and conclude that 
hours constraints is unsatisfactory as an explanation for moonlighting. Patterns of 
mobility into and out of second jobs over time are examined by Paxson and Sicherman 
(1996), who conclude that moonlighting is a dynamic process with most workers 
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experiencing moonlighting at some point in their working lives, and that the hours 
constraints explanation for moonlighting fails to account for the fact that over time 
workers can avoid hours constraints by searching for new jobs. Bell et al. (1997) 
investigate if moonlighting acts as a “hedge” against unemployment, but little evidence 
is found to support this motive for moonlighting. Evidence from transition economies 
suggests that moonlighting is likely to be transitory and correlated with future job 
mobility. Guariglia and Kim (2006) find that moonlighting is transitory and generally 
associated with career shifts, and Panos, Pouliakas and Zangelidis (2014) suggest that 
moonlighting may facilitate job transition by acting as a stepping stone towards new 
primary jobs, particularly self-employment.  
The motivations for multiple job-holding amongst offshore workers in the North Sea 
oil and gas industry are investigated by Dickey, Watson and Zangelidis (2011) using the 
same sample of individuals as used in this paper. This study differs in several important 
respects. Dickey et al (2011) focussed only on the sub-sample of respondents who had 
two jobs and explored what may induce people to hold a second job for financial 
reasons as opposed to other non-pecuniary motives. This analysis used revealed 
preference data from the questionnaire. This study uses stated preference data from all 
respondents to the survey and allows us to identify individuals’ preferences for different 
multiple job combinations. The respondents are presented with a number of scenarios 
describing a primary job and a potential second job. Respondents are asked to state 
whether they would take a second job conditional on the first job. This paper provides 
a new and unique contribution to the existing literature on multiple job-holding by the 
novel application of a discrete choice experiment, a stated preference method. 
Specifically, the methodological strategy allows us: (i) to use the full sample and explore 
why individuals seek a second job, rather than restricting the attention to actual 
realisations of second job-holding that involve individuals queuing for a second job and 
being selected by an employer; (ii) to pursue a more in-depth analysis of the work 
specific characteristics that appeal to individuals seeking a second job; and (iii) to 
calculate marginal rates of substitution and place a monetary value on features like job 
security, type of contract and other job characteristics.  
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3. The data 
We collect data on working conditions and moonlighting behaviour using a survey 
individuals employed in the U.K. North Sea oil and gas industry. This industry plays an 
important role in the U.K.’s labour market by providing 480,000 jobs to individuals 
across the U.K., including 100,000 highly skilled jobs in Scotland. Offshore oil work is 
characterised by constrained working hours1, risky working conditions2, regular long 
periods of onshore time (during which they are not working in their primary job)3, and 
high wages. Offshore workers may moonlight to overcome primary job labour-income 
constraints. Yet, offshore jobs tend to be well-paid jobs, and thus, individuals may not 
moonlight for financial or hours-constraint reasons, but rather for non-pecuniary 
reasons.  
While the sample consists of a specific population within a particular industry, this 
study has broader relevance because the sample allows us to study multiple job-holding 
within the context of an industry that is strictly hours constrained with a hazardous 
working environment, and which encompasses the different motivations for holding 
more than one job. For instance, offshore workers may moonlight as a means to 
overcome labour supply restrictions, or as a way to obtain new skills and move to 
another career. The behaviour and motivations for multiple job-holding will be similar 
to multiple job-holding amongst workers in emergency services (firemen, policemen), 
the armed forces, and workers in the fishing and mining industries. For an 
investigation of moonlighting within the fisheries sector, see Dickey and Theodossiou 
(2006). 
                                                 
1 The European Union working time regulations that came into force in 2003 impose a time constraint 
on offshore employees who are not able to freely adjust their working hours (Individuals may agree to 
work more than 48 hours per week, but the maximum number of working hours allowed over a 52 week 
period is 2304). Consequently offshore employees are labour-income constrained in their primary job.  
2 The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (Key Programme 3: Asset Integrity Programme) raised concerns 
about worker safety in the UK oil and gas industry (HSE, 2007) 
3 In our sample, workers typically work four-week rotations. During which they spend two weeks offshore 
and two weeks onshore. 
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We investigate individuals’ decisions to moonlight and relate this to characteristics of 
the primary job and second job using a form of conjoint analysis, a discrete choice 
experiment. This method originated in marketing research and has been applied to 
transportation research, and in environmental and health economics to elicit 
preferences for non-market goods (Kanninen, 2007). To date, the application of 
discrete choice experiments to labour market behaviour is not widespread (see 
Kristensen and Johansson; 2008, and Panos and Theodossiou; 2013, for studies that 
have adopted a job vignettes approach). Discrete choice experiments are based on 
Lancaster’s theory of value (Lancaster, 1966), and can be used to estimate the trade-offs 
that individuals make between the dimensions of goods and services. 
The first stage in designing a discrete choice experiment is the definition of the 
attributes or characteristics of the good or service. We define the good as an 
employment package consisting of a primary job and a potential second job. The 
characteristics of both the primary and the secondary job are selected to cover the range 
of possible moonlighting motivations suggested by the theoretical literature and to be 
realistic representations of the choices that offshore workers may face. An initial set of 
primary and second job characteristics were identified from the theoretical literature. 
These were refined in an iterative manner following a series of face-to-face interviews 
with key organisations in the U.K. oil and gas industry (including United Kingdom 
Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA), Step Change In Safety, and the AMICUS 
and OILC trade unions). During the interviews, the authors discussed the relevance of 
the identified characteristics to offshore workers and asked if any important 
characteristics of offshore work were omitted. 
Based on the theoretical literature and interviews we describe the primary job using 
four characteristics; job security, job safety, offshore working time, and household 
financial situation. Similarly, the second job is described using four characteristics; type 
of second job, job satisfaction, new career and wages. Having selected the characteristics 
to include in the discrete choice experiment, levels or realisations must be attached to 
each of the characteristics. These levels should be plausible descriptions of primary and 
second jobs that offshore workers could have. The levels should cover the possible 
range for each of the characteristics, and each level should be described in a way that is 
meaningful to respondents. Below we define each of the characteristics and their 
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corresponding levels and then we relate these characteristics to the theoretical 
literature. A summary of the attributes and levels and how these relate to the 
moonlighting motivations proposed on the existing literature is also provided in 
Appendix A.  
The primary job was described by four characteristics. If individuals moonlight as a 
hedging strategy against unemployment then the job security of the primary job is a 
relevant characteristic. Offshore workers are typically employed on one of three types of 
contract that differ in security; temporary contract (lasting less than 12 months), fixed 
term contract (lasting between one and three years), and permanent contract. 
Consequently, the attribute job security described by these three contract types is 
included in the discrete choice experiment.  
The heterogeneous jobs argument states that individuals in jobs with high risk of 
accidents may get a second job as a “way out” of their primary job. The extraction of oil 
and gas (both volatile substances) in the often harsh offshore environment means that 
offshore work can be risky. The job safety of the primary job was expressed by three 
levels; low risk of work related accidents, medium risk of work related accidents, high 
risk of work related accidents.  
One way in which offshore workers hours/income are constrained is by the shifts that 
they work. These shifts are characterised by regular long periods of onshore time. At the 
time of data collection companies were changing their shift patterns. Based on the 
interviews working time was identified as an important primary job characteristic to 
respondents. Based on the proposed changes working time was described by two levels; 
two-weeks onshore and two weeks offshore, and three weeks onshore and two weeks 
offshore.  
The fourth primary job characteristic is the household’s financial situation this 
captures the household’s need, and was expressed qualitatively. Explicit quantitative 
income levels for this characteristic were avoided because how well a specified income 
satisfies a household’s needs depends on the household composition. To ensure that 
the household’s financial situation was interpreted in the same way by all respondents 
three levels were chosen; income is not enough to cover regular expenses, income is just 
enough to cover regular expenses, income is enough to cover regular expenses and have 
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some savings. We deliberately specify household financial situation instead of earnings 
from the primary job because this variable is more informative since individuals may 
come from households varying in size and composition, and therefore the salary earned 
may not accurately reflect their overall financial capacity. 
The second job is also described by four characteristics. In the characteristics of the 
second job we distinguish between salaried and non-salaried employment, thus type of 
second job can take three levels; self-employed, part-time employee, full-time employee. 
The job satisfaction derived from the second job was expressed as two levels. The 
second job was either “a job you enjoy” or a job that “doesn’t offer any particular 
satisfaction”. The opportunities that the second job provides to gain skills and 
experience that would help individuals to start a new career were expressed by two 
levels; the second job would either provide an opportunity to “gain experience to start a 
new career” or would not provide an opportunity to gain experience to start a new 
career. The income from the second job was expressed as the wages earned per onshore 
period. The calculation of the weekly wages from the second job will depend on 
whether the working time in the primary job provided two weeks onshore or three 
weeks onshore. Similarly, if the wages from the second job were expressed as weekly 
wages, total earning would also be affected by the working time in the primary job. The 
wages were explicitly defined in quantitative terms as a continuous variable to allow the 
marginal rates of substitution between wages in the second job and the other primary 
and secondary job characteristics to be calculated. The wages were described by six 
levels £300, £600, £900, £1200, £1500, and £1800 per onshore period (the range was 
based on the distribution of second job earnings reported in the British Household 
Panel Survey). 
The characteristics of the primary job and second job are combined to define a primary 
plus second job employment ‘package’. To calculate the relative importance of each of 
the primary and second job characteristics in a respondent’s decision to moonlight, 
respondents are asked to imagine that they are employed in the primary offshore job 
specified and then state if they would take the second job as described. Figure 1 
provides an example of this choice. Discrete choice experiments have typically 
presented respondents with choice sets containing two or more packages and asked 
them to select their most preferred package. This multiple-choice format is not suitable 
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for our research question because we are interested in how the characteristics of both 
the primary job and second job affect the respondent’s moonlighting decision. Thus, to 
be able to identify the effect of each of these characteristics in individuals’ decision, 
characteristics of both jobs should be included in the discrete choice experiment. We 
do not present two (or more) primary and second job packages and asked individuals to 
select the package they would prefer, because in this case the moonlighting decision 
cannot be separated from the primary job decision. We aim to mimic reality by 
assuming that individuals hold a primary job and then have the decision to take on a 
second job or not.  
[Figure 1] 
In total the discrete choice experiment includes eight job characteristics. A full factorial 
combination of these characteristics and their levels results in 3,888 primary and 
potential second job packages. These are too many to ask any one respondent to 
evaluate. Thus the number of packages must be reduced for the questionnaires. The 
reduced number of packages needs to provide sufficient data to permit estimation of 
the relative importance of each characteristic, and when the number of packages is 
reduced the characteristics of support should not be correlated with each other. To 
select the job packages to present in the questionnaire from the set of all possible 
combinations we used experimental design theory and an orthogonal main effects plan 
(Cox, 1958; Sloane – website). This reduced the number of combinations to 36. Due to 
the possibility of respondent fatigue, these were more combinations than we wanted to 
include in one questionnaire. Thus, we split the 36 packages into two sets of 18 
packages. Discrete choice experiments typically ask respondents to make between 8 and 
32 choices (Kanninen, 2007; Bech et al, 2010). The task’s complexity for respondents 
may be increasing in the number of choices, and respondents may become fatigued as 
they progress through the choices (Swait and Adamowicz, 2001). Furthermore, longer 
questionnaires on average have lower response rates (Dillman 2001). One solution is 
spread the choices over several versions of the questionnaire with a sub set of choices in 
each version. However, the effect of complexity, respondent fatigue, and longer 
questionnaires on response rates must be balanced with the possibility of a low or zero 
response rate to one or more questionnaire versions; an outcome that would prevent 
the DCE data from being analysed. To assign the packages to one of the two sets we 
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added an additional two level variable to the experimental design. By assigning packages 
to each of two sets in this way we ensured that attribute levels were balanced and 
orthogonal both within and across sets (Hensher et al., 2006).  
From the two sets of 18 choices, we developed two questionnaires, which were identical 
except for the DCE choices (see Appendix B). Data were collected using self-completed 
questionnaires. For the design of the questionnaires the authors consulted key 
organisations in the Oil and Gas industry, including United Kingdom Offshore 
Operators Association (UKOOA), Step Change In Safety, and the AMICUS and OILC 
trade unions. The questionnaires were distributed, through the offshore installation 
managers (OIMS) of 152 different UK North Sea offshore installations, to a random 
sample of 760 offshore workers in January 2007. This represents approximately 96% of 
all the UK North Sea offshore installations. Data collection took place over three 
months. In addition to the stated preference data, the questionnaire collected 
information about the personal characteristics and job characteristics of the 
respondents. 
4. Analysis of the discrete choice experiment 
Analysis of discrete choice experiment data is based on random utility theory (RUT) 
(McFadden, 1973). We assume that that there are two alternatives for the individual to 
moonlight or not. Thus, the indirect utility function for respondent n can be written as  
𝑢𝑖𝑛  =  𝑢𝑖(𝒛𝒏, 𝜀𝑖𝑛) 
where i = 1 when the respondent moonlights and i = 0 when the respondent does not 
moonlight. The determinants of utility are represented by zn a multidimensional vector 
which includes a vector of primary job characteristics xp and a vector of second job 
characteristics xs. We assume that the individual knows his preferences with certainty, 
but these preferences contain elements that are unobservable by the researcher, εin. We 
assume that respondents will moonlight when the change in utility from u1n to u0n is 
positive. The multidimensional vector zn is assumed to be linear-in-parameters. By using 
an orthogonal main effects plan to select the profiles included in the discrete choice 
experiment, we assume that the utility function is linear in parameters. Thus, we can 
identify the main effect of each characteristic, but interaction terms between 
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characteristics are confounded. By assuming the additive stochastic component in  is 
independent and identically distributed (IID) extreme value type 1, a logit model is 
used for estimation. The probability that respondent, n, in choice set t chooses to 
moonlight in second job j with characteristics 𝑥𝑗
𝑠 given the characteristics of the primary 
job 𝑥𝑗
𝑝 is: 
𝑃𝑛 𝑡(𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑗| 𝒛𝑛𝑗) =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝛽𝑥𝑛𝑗
 
However, each respondent makes up to 18 choices and we have panel data. Thus, εin 
may not be independently distributed due to error correlations within the set of choices 
made by the same respondent. To allow for this, we estimate a random effects logit. 
𝑃𝑛 𝑡(𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑗| 𝒛𝑛𝑗) = 𝑃(𝑥𝑛𝑗𝛽 + 𝜐𝑛)
 
The models above assume that the parameters β are the same for all respondents, i.e. 
respondents on average have the same preferences. In addition, preference 
heterogeneity can be incorporated into this model using a random parameters panel 
logit model (Train, 2001). The random parameters model assumes that βn is a vector of 
coefficients for individual n representing the individual’s tastes. This model considers 
the likelihood of observing a sequence of choices. This is represented as the product of 
the logit probabilities. 
𝑆𝑛 = ∏{𝑃𝑛 𝑡(𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑗𝑡| 𝑥𝑗𝑡
𝑝 )}
𝑇
𝑡  
The coefficients can vary across the population with density f(β). If βn were known to 
the researcher, then the probability of respondent n making a sequence of choices Sn 
would be conditional on βn. As this is not the case, the probability of observing a 
sequence of choices is the integral over all possible values of βn.  
𝑃𝑛 = ∫ 𝑆𝑛 (𝛽)𝑓(𝛽)𝑑(𝛽) 
In this case, the coefficients may vary over respondents but are constant for all choices 
made by the same respondent. To estimate the random parameters logit, the researcher 
must first specify the independent variables that vary across the population and the 
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distribution of each of the random coefficients. Most applications of the random 
parameters logit to date have specified f(β) as normal or log-normal. 
A random parameters logit model where the constant term is specified as random with 
a normal distribution is an approximation to the random effects logit. We compare the 
random effects logit, with a random parameters logit where the constant is specified to 
have a normal distribution, and a random parameters logit where preference 
heterogeneity is incorporated by specifying that the coefficients of all attributes in the 
discrete choice experiment are random. The fit of the models is compared using the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
5. Results 
A total of 330 individuals completed and returned questionnaires. This represents a 
43% response rate4. Of these 330 respondents to the questionnaire, 314 respondents 
were male. Given the low number of female respondents we focus the analysis of the 
discrete choice experiments on male respondents. Table 1 reports demographic and job 
characteristics for the sample of male respondents5. The profile of the average 
respondent is that of a male worker, aged 44, who is married or co-habitats and has a 
child. 
[Table 1] 
                                                 
4 Most applications of discrete choice experiments have elicited the public’s (or a relevant group’s) 
willingness to pay for public goods such as the environment or health care, or for transportation. For 
existing studies response rates vary widely from less than 20% (for studies of the general public’s 
preference for public goods) to over 90% (for studies of patients’ preferences for health care). As with all 
survey research, non-response bias is a concern. 
5 Typically studies compare the characteristics of respondents with the characteristics of the population of 
interest, in our case offshore workers in the UK oil and gas industry. To the authors knowledge, no 
official data from the oil and gas industry sector are available that describe the characteristics of offshore 
workers. However, an inspection of the demographic characteristics of the sample of the individuals 
employed in the “extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas” sector and the “service activities 
incidental to oil and gas extraction excluding surveying” sector (available in the British Household Panel 
Survey) did not uncover notable differences to the sample characteristics of this study. 
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In the discrete choice experiment respondents were asked a series of 18 choices, 
resulting in a panel dataset of 5,652 observations. Respondents were roughly equally 
split over the two versions of the questionnaire (167 respondents to version 1 and 147 
respondents to version 2). Even though respondents were asked to complete 18 choices 
there was little evidence of item non-response. The number of missing values for each 
choice question across both versions of the questionnaire is reported in Appendix B, 
this ranges from zero to a maximum of 3. Furthermore, there is no evidence of higher 
item non-response rates to later choices in the discrete choice experiment. We 
acknowledge that this is a crude proxy for respondent fatigue. It is possible that the 
variance of responses increases over the choices. However, all respondents completed 
the choices in the same order so it is not possible to identify more subtle effects of 
fatigue. The proportion of respondents stating that they would moonlight in the 
specified second job (given the primary job) varied over choices in the discrete choice 
experiment (Appendix B): for example, 4.82% of respondents would moonlight in the 
package presented in choice 3 of version 1, while 86.14% of respondents would 
moonlight in the package presented in choice 7 of version 1. Overall of the choices, 
51.22% of respondents stated they would moonlight.  
Table 2, Model 1 reports the results of the random effects logit model where the 
dependent variable is whether the respondent stated they would moonlight or not6. All 
attributes included in the discrete choice experiment (except for income from the 
second job) are categorical and thus are coded as dummy variables. While income for 
the second job was presented as one of six levels, we include this in the model as a 
continuous variable in order to permit the calculation of marginal rates of substitution. 
This is in line with applications of discrete choice experiments. We explored model 
specifications that included terms to estimate the effect of respondents’ socioeconomic 
characteristics on their propensity to moonlight. These variables were not significant 
and thus were omitted from reported models. We also explored whether people tend to 
                                                 
6 The model was re-estimated using a random parameters repeated discrete choice model where only the 
constant term was specified as random with a normal distribution. This is an approximation to the 
random effects logit and the results from both models were qualitatively similar. The estimates are 
available upon request from the authors. 
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respond differently to hypothetical scenarios depending on their current employment 
conditions using interaction terms. We find no supporting evidence and do not report 
the interactions terms in the presented results.  
Ceteris paribus, there is a disinclination to moonlight, as indicated by the statistically 
significant negative constant term. All job characteristics included in the discrete choice 
experiment have a statistically significant effect on the probability that a respondent 
would state he was willing to moonlight, except working time. Thus, respondents would 
moonlight to overcome financial constraints which they may face, but financial motives 
are not sufficient to explain this labour market behaviour: heterogeneous-jobs motives 
are also important in the decision to hold a second job. 
[Table 2] 
Working on a temporary contract (lasting less than 12 months) relative to a fixed term 
contract (lasting between 1-3 years) in the primary job significantly increased the 
probability of moonlighting, suggesting that individuals would get a second job as a way 
to insure against job insecurity. Relative to a primary job with low risk of injury, a 
primary job with a high risk of injury increased the probability of moonlighting.  
Relative to household income from the primary job ‘not being enough’, household 
income levels of ‘just enough’ and ‘more than enough’ had a negative effect on the 
probability of moonlighting: this is evidence of the financial motives behind 
moonlighting. Relative to a full-time second job, a part-time second job and a self-
employed second job both increased the probability of moonlighting. A finding that 
may be interpreted as evidence that individuals may hold a second job in order to 
maintain flexible work schedules.  
Respondents were more likely to state that they would moonlight if the second job 
provided job satisfaction, and similarly if the second job offered an opportunity to gain 
experience to start a new career. This is an indication that workers may view second job-
holding as a means of obtaining new skills that would enable them to exit their current 
primary offshore job and pursue alternative employment pathways. The earnings from 
the second job had a positive effect on respondents’ probability of stating they would 
moonlight. The results of the random effects logit indicate that approximately 45% of 
the variance in the model is from the panel-level variance (ρ=0.448).  
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Table 2, Model 2 reports the results of the second random parameters logit model, 
where all coefficients except earnings from the second job, and the constant were 
specified as random. There were no strong a-priori reasons to restrict the sign of the 
coefficients to be either positive or negative, thus normal distributions were specified 
for all variables. The constant term is fixed (not specified as random) to aid model 
identification. We use the results of the model to calculate the marginal rates of 
substitution between a change in attribute levels and earnings from the second job. 
Thus, the coefficient of the earnings attribute is fixed, to aid the calculation of these 
marginal rates of substitution (Train, 2001). Simulation was performed using 2000 
Halton draws.  
Compared to the random effects logit model, the random parameter logit models have 
improved model fit, indicated by the lower (absolute) value of the log likelihood at 
maximisation and lower value of the Akaike Information Criteria. The parameter 
estimates from the logit and random parameters logits are not directly comparable 
because parameter estimates and model variances are confound in discrete choice 
models. In Model 2, for all attributes the standard deviation is significant at the 1% 
level; this indicates that preferences vary in the sample. With respect to the primary and 
second job characteristics which were statistically significant in the logit model the 
results are qualitatively the same. Consider the attributes that were not significant in 
the logit model (permanent contract, medium risk, and working time), in the random 
parameters logit model the mean is not significant but the standard deviation is 
significant. This implies that within the sample these variables have opposing effects on 
respondents’ probability to moonlight.  
The estimated means and standard deviations indicate the share of the population that 
place a positive or negative value on job attributes (Table 3). The mean and the 
standard deviation of the normally distributed parameter are obtained from the 
estimates. These are then converted to a standard normal distribution, by dividing the 
mean estimate by the standard deviation estimate resulting in z, this gives the 
equivalent point for the mean in a standard normal distribution. Given the standard 
normal distribution has mean 0 and is symmetric, one can calculate the amount of the 
distribution between 0 and z and add this to or subtract this from 0.5 (depending on 
the sign of the coefficient) to determine the proportion of the parameter distribution 
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that is positive and negative. Consider the distribution of the estimated coefficient for 
part-time (compared to full-time) second job, the estimated mean is 0.389 and the 
estimated standard deviation is 1.078, thus 64% of the distribution is positive and 36% 
of the distribution is negative. This implies that a part-time second job is preferred to a 
full time second job for about two thirds of the sample and one third of the sample 
would prefer a full-time to a part-time second job. Similarly, over three quarters of the 
sample would prefer a second job that would give them the opportunity to develop new 
skills and pursue a new career, and a second job that offers them job satisfaction.  
[Table 3] 
The ratio of the first job characteristics coefficient to the second job earnings coefficient 
is a measure of the amount of monetary compensation required in the second job to 
make respondents’ utility equivalent to the base category for that attribute. The 
marginal rates of substitution for the random parameters logit7 are presented in Table 
4. For instance, to compensate workers for a temporary contract compared to a fixed 
contract, an individual needs to earn £260 more from their second job, ceteris paribus. 
Similarly the ratio of the second job characteristics coefficient to the second job 
earnings coefficient is a measure of respondents’ willingness to pay for these 
characteristics compared to the base category for that attribute. All other things equal, 
respondents are willing to pay £413 in order to be self-employed in their second job. In 
other words being self-employed, compared to being a full-time employee, in the second 
job is equivalent to earning £413 more from that job. This is a novel approach in the 
literature that enables us to tease out the multiple motives for holding a second job and 
sheds more light on their relative importance by assigning a monetary value to both 
primary and secondary job characteristics. One of the interesting outcomes is that 
individuals appear to highly value the job satisfaction they receive from the second job, 
and the opportunity to use a second job as a way to gain new experience and start a new 
career. This is an important finding because it suggests that secondary employment can 
act as an incubator for new skills and labour market experience, and highlights the 
                                                 
7 This is the authors’ preferred estimate. The marginal rates of substitution based on the random effects 
logit model are also available upon request. 
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possibility of human capital spillover effects between primary and secondary jobs. 
Furthermore, it may potentially be an indicator of quit intentions from the offshore 
industry. 
[Table 4] 
We calculated the marginal rates of substitution to eliminate scale parameter confound 
found in binary choice models and to present the coefficients into a meaningful metric. 
In considering the results one should focus on the relative, rather than the absolute, 
magnitude. The absolute magnitude may be inflated by two factors. First, the sample is 
drawn from a high-paid sector and thus respondents may have a lower marginal utility 
of income than the population. Second, studies have indicated that stated preference 
studies are prone to hypothetical bias (List and Gallet, 2001; Blumenschien et al, 2008). 
Two studies have empirically investigated the correspondence between hypothetical and 
real valuations elicited using discrete choice experiments and these give conflicting 
results. Carlsson and Martinsson (2001) find no significant differences in donations to 
an environmental charity. Lusk and Schroeder (2004) find significant differences in the 
probability of purchase for certified beef steaks. However, they find no significant 
difference in marginal rates of substitution. More evidence exists for the comparison of 
hypothetical and actual valuations obtained using the contingent valuation stated 
preference method. These studies typically report higher valuations when questions 
asked are hypothetical rather than real (Liljas and Blumenschein, 2000; List and Gallet, 
2001). This evidence should be kept in mind when interpreting the marginal rates of 
substitution calculated from the discrete choice experiment. 
A number of papers, starting with Adamowicz et al (1994), have explored merging 
stated preference and revealed preference responses to draw on the advantages of both 
types of data. We collected revealed preference data on respondents moonlighting and 
characteristics of the first and second job corresponding to those included in the 
discrete choice experiment. However, only 17 respondents reported moonlighting 
(similar rate to the national level). Including these observations in a joint model does 
not change our results. 
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6. Conclusion 
Our paper contributes to the largely unexplored issue of why individuals hold multiple 
jobs. Theoretical models of moonlighting suggest there are two reasons for individuals 
to hold a second job: financial motives (hours-constraints) and non-pecuniary motives 
(heterogeneous jobs). We assess the relative importance of these motives using a 
discrete choice experiment. We investigate this using purposefully collected stated 
preference data from offshore oil and gas workers. This is a novel approach that allows 
us to identify the possible reasons for why individuals may look for a second job, and 
that overcomes the limitations of the existing literature that relies only upon observed 
multiple job holders. The offshore workers were chosen because of their strict hours 
constraint and their exposure to a risky work environment.  
Second jobs are found to enable individuals to overcome financial constraints and 
increase their labour income. In addition, workers are also attracted to second jobs 
because they provide an opportunity to develop new skills that workers may later use to 
move to a different career pathway. Second job-holding may therefore be an 
informative indicator as it may reveal individuals’ intentions to exit the offshore 
industry.  
 In contrast to previous studies such as Bell et al (1997), we do find evidence that 
moonlighting may be a hedging strategy against job insecurity in the primary job. 
Further, our study highlights specific job characteristics of second jobs that are 
appealing to those who moonlight for non-pecuniary reasons. The flexibility of the 
work schedule and the perceived level of job satisfaction from the secondary 
employment are important determinants of individuals’ decisions to hold a second job. 
Our findings contribute to a better understanding of this labour market behaviour and 
demonstrate the usefulness of purposefully collecting data to investigate labour market 
phenomenon that are not adequately covered by existing large scale panel datasets. 
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Figure 1: Example of a primary and second job package, and the choice that 
respondents were asked to make 
Current job characteristics and financial 
situation 
 
Second job characteristics 
 Fixed-term contract (lasting between 1 
and 3 years) 
 
 You would be full time (usually more 
than 30 hours per month) 
 High risk of work related accidents  The job would not offer you any 
particular satisfaction 
 
 You spend 2 weeks offshore and 3 weeks 
onshore 
 
 You would gain experience to help you 
start a new career, or build up a new 
business outside the oil industry 
 
 The household income is just enough to 
cover regular household needs  
 
 The usual monthly take home earnings 
are £300 
 
If your current job and financial situation were as described on the left hand side 
above, would you take up the second job described? 
 
  
yes no 
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Table 1: Demographic and job characteristics for male only sample 
 Mean/% 
Individual & household characteristics 
Average age (years) 44.2 
Household size 3.0 
Married/living together 84% 
No. of children in household 0.76 
No. of contributors to household income 1.7 
Education 
Up to secondary school education 23% 
Diploma/Vocational qualifications 60% 
University degree 11% 
Postgraduate degree  4% 
Annual household income 
Less than £15,000 1% 
£15,000-£19,999 1% 
£20,000-£24,999 3% 
£25,000-£29,999 14% 
£30,000-£39,999 20% 
£40,000-£49,999 18% 
£50,000-£59,999 42% 
Financial Situation 
Living comfortably  42% 
Doing alright  44% 
Just about getting by  12% 
Finding it quite difficult 1% 
Finding it very difficult 1% 
Primary job 
Monthly net pay  3096.5 
Hours worked per day  13.0 
Days worked per month  15.1 
Temporary contract  4% 
Fixed contract  7% 
Permanent contract  89% 
Preference over work hrs: more 0.03 
Preference over work hrs: same 0.27 
Preference over work hrs: less 0.70 
No. of observations 314 
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Table 2: Results of discrete choice experiment for logit model and random 
parameters logit model 
  
Model 1: 
Random 
effects logit 
 
Model 2: Random 
parameters logit (constant 
and 2nd job income fixed) 
  
Coefficient 
(SE) 
 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Standard 
Dev. 
(SE) 
Type of contracta Permanent 
0.062 
(0.086) 
 
0.088 
(0.115) 
0.912*** 
(0157) 
 Temporary 
0.216*** 
(0.087) 
 
0.260** 
(0.111) 
0.059*** 
(0.218) 
Job safetyb Medium risk 
0.023 
(0.085) 
 
0.098 
(0.114) 
0.947*** 
(0.157) 
 High risk 
0.243*** 
(0.087) 
 
0.319*** 
(0.122) 
0.938*** 
(0.167) 
Working time  
-0.054 
(0.071) 
 
0.003 
(0.099) 
0.868*** 
(0.119) 
Household 
incomec 
Just enough 
-1.010*** 
(0.088) 
 
-1.254*** 
(0.131) 
1.147*** 
(0.149) 
 
More than 
enough 
-1.944*** 
(0.093) 
 
-2.231*** 
(0.132) 
0.961*** 
(0.156) 
Type of 2nd jobd Part-time 
0.225*** 
(0.088) 
 
0.389*** 
(0.121) 
1.078*** 
(0.157) 
 Self-employed 
0.287*** 
(0.086) 
 
0.413*** 
(0.111) 
0.826*** 
(0.162) 
2nd Job 
satisfactione 
 
1.037*** 
(0.075) 
 
1.311*** 
(0.119) 
1.175*** 
(0.133) 
New career  
0.827*** 
(0.072) 
 
0.979*** 
(0.117) 
1.319*** 
(0.136) 
2nd job earnings 
(per onshore 
period) 
 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
 
Constant  
-1.883*** 
(0.173) 
 
-2.451*** 
(0.181) 
 
συ  
1.634 
(0.088) 
   
ρ  
0.448 
(0.027) 
   
Log (l)  -3341.83  -2901.86  
N  5577  5577  
Akaike Information Criterion 6709.66  5851.72  
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. a Omitted level: Fixed term contract; b omitted 
level: Low risk; c omitted level: not enough income; d omitted level: Full-time 
employment; e omitted level: doesn’t offer any particular satisfaction; f omitted level: 
will not gain experience to start new career; g omitted level: no formal qualifications.  
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Table 3: Proportion of sample population with positive/negative coefficient for each 
job characteristic based on the random parameter logit estimates 
Attribute Level Positive Negative 
Type of contracta Permanent 50 50 
 Temporary 50 50 
Job safetyb Medium risk 50 50 
 High risk 64 36 
Working time  50 50 
Household incomec Just enough 13.8 86.2 
 More than enough 1 99 
Type of 2nd jobd Part-time 64 36 
 Self-employed 69 31 
2nd Job satisfactione  86.6 13.4 
Entrepreneurial activitiesf  77.1 22.9 
Notes: a Omitted level: Fixed term contract; b omitted level: Low risk; c omitted level: 
not enough income; d omitted level: Full-time employment; e omitted level: doesn’t 
offer any particular satisfaction; f omitted level: will not gain experience to start new 
career; g omitted level: no formal qualifications. 
 
 
Table 4: Marginal rates of substitution calculated using the random parameter logit 
estimates 
Attribute Level Mean (£ per month) 
Type of contracta Permanent . 
 Temporary 260 
Job safetyb Medium risk . 
 High risk 319 
Working time  . 
Household incomec Just enough 1254 
 More than enough 2231 
Type of 2nd jobd Part-time 389 
 Self-employed 413 
2nd Job satisfactione  1311 
Entrepreneurial activitiesf  979 
Constant  2451 
Notes: a Omitted level: Fixed term contract; b omitted level: Low risk; c omitted level: 
not enough income; d omitted level: Full-time employment; e omitted level: doesn’t 
offer any particular satisfaction; f omitted level: will not gain experience to start new 
career; g omitted level: no formal qualifications. 
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Appendix A: Description of attributes and levels of discrete choice experiment  
Attributes Levels 
Motivation for 
moonlighting 
Primary job   
Job security (i) temporary contract 
(lasting less than 12 
months)  
(ii) fixed term contract 
(lasting between one 
and three years) 
(iii) permanent contract 
Hedging strategy against 
unemployment (Bell et al., 
1997) 
Job safety (i) low risk of work related 
accidents 
(ii) medium risk of work 
related accidents 
(iii) high risk of work 
related accidents 
Heterogeneous jobs 
(Paxson and Sicherman, 
1996; Kimmel and 
Conway, 2001; Böheim 
and Taylor, 2004) 
Working time (i) two-weeks onshore and two 
weeks offshore 
(ii) three weeks onshore and 
two weeks offshore 
Hours 
constraints/financial 
motives (Krishnan, 1990) 
Household’s financial 
situation 
(i) income is not enough 
to cover regular 
expenses 
(ii) income is just enough 
to cover regular 
expenses 
(iii) income is enough to 
cover regular expenses 
and have some savings 
Hours 
constraints/financial 
motives (Krishnan, 1990) 
Secondary job   
Type of second job (i) self-employed 
(ii) part-time employee 
(iii) full-time employee 
Heterogeneous jobs  
(Paxson and Sicherman, 
1996; Kimmel and 
Conway, 2001; Böheim 
and Taylor, 2004) 
Job satisfaction (i) “a job you enjoy”  
(ii) a job that “doesn’t offer 
any particular 
satisfaction” 
Heterogeneous jobs  
(Paxson and Sicherman, 
1996; Kimmel and 
Conway, 2001; Böheim 
and Taylor, 2004) 
New career (i) the second job would 
either provide an 
opportunity to “gain 
experience to start a 
new career” 
(ii) the second job would 
not provide an 
opportunity to gain 
Heterogeneous jobs 
(Guariglia and Kim, 2006; 
Panos et al., 2014) 
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experience to start a 
new career 
Wages Per onshore period: 
(i) £300 
(ii) £600 
(iii) £900 
(iv) £1200 
(v) £1500 
(vi) £1800  
Hours 
constraints/financial 
motives (Krishnan, 1990) 
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Appendix B: Summary of the discrete choice experiment design and responses by questionnaire version 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: * 2/2 denotes the level two weeks offshore and two weeks onshore, and 2/3 denotes the level two weeks offshore and three weeks onshore  
Version 1 
First Job 
 
Second job   
Choice 
No 
Job 
security 
Job 
safety 
Working 
time* 
Financial 
situation 
Type of 2nd 
job  
Job 
satisfaction 
New 
career 
Income Moonlight 
(%) 
Missing 
1 Fixed term Low 2/2 Not managing Self employed Yes Yes 600 71.95 2 
2 Temporary Low 2/2 Can save Full time Yes Yes 900 49.70 1 
3 Temporary Low 2/3 Can save Self employed No No 300 4.82 0 
4 Permanent Medium 2/3 Not managing Full time Yes No 300 40.36 0 
5 Permanent Medium 2/3 Just managing Self employed Yes Yes 1800 78.79 1 
6 Permanent Medium 2/2 Can save Part time No No 1200 27.88 1 
7 Temporary High 2/3 Not managing Part time Yes Yes 1200 86.14 0 
8 Permanent High 2/3 Not managing Self employed Yes No 900 71.69 0 
9 Fixed term High 2/2 Just managing Part time No No 300 12.12 1 
10 Permanent High 2/3 Just managing Part time No Yes 600 42.42 1 
11 Fixed term Medium 2/2 Can save Self employed Yes Yes 1500 65.64 3 
12 Fixed term Medium 2/2 Not managing Part time No No 1800 67.48 3 
13 Fixed term Low 2/3 Just managing Full time Yes Yes 1200 62.42 1 
14 Permanent High 2/2 Can save Full time Yes No 600 21.34 2 
15 Fixed term Low 2/3 Can save Part time No No 1500 27.61 3 
16 Temporary Medium 2/3 Just managing Full time No Yes 900 43.56 3 
17 Temporary Low 2/2 Just managing Self employed No No 1800 54.27 2 
18 Temporary High 2/2 Not managing Full time No Yes 1500 79.88 2 
29 
Version 2 
First Job 
 
Second Job 
 
  
Choice 
No 
Job 
security 
Job 
safety 
Working 
time* 
Financial 
Situation 
Type of 2nd 
job  
Job 
satisfaction 
New 
career 
Income Moonlight 
(%) 
Missing 
1 Fixed High 2/2 Just Full time No Yes 300 27.40 1 
2 Temporary Medium 2/2 Just Self employed Yes No 1200 66.44 1 
3 Fixed Medium 2/3 Save Part time No Yes 900 33.56 1 
4 Temporary High 2/3 Save Part time Yes Yes 1800 75.42 1 
5 Temporary Medium 2/2 Save Full time No No 600 12.41 2 
6 Fixed Low 2/3 Not Full time No No 1200 56.25 3 
7 Permanent Low 2/2 Just Part time Yes Yes 1500 72.11 0 
8 Temporary Low 2/3 Just Part time Yes No 600 42.47 1 
9 Permanent Low 2/3 Save Self employed Yes Yes 300 32.19 1 
10 Fixed High 2/3 Save Full time Yes No 1800 56.85 1 
11 Permanent Low 2/2 Not Part time No No 900 57.93 2 
12 Temporary Medium 2/2 Not Part time Yes Yes 300 61.81 3 
13 Permanent Medium 2/3 Just Full time Yes No 1500 61.11 3 
14 Fixed High 2/2 Just Self employed Yes No 900 58.33 3 
15 Permanent High 2/2 Save Self employed No Yes 1200 41.67 3 
16 Fixed Medium 2/3 Not Self employed No Yes 600 53.10 2 
17 Temporary High 2/3 Not Self employed No No 1500 72.41 2 
18 Permanent Low 2/2 Not Full time No Yes 1800 76.71 1 
Notes: * 2/2 denotes the level two weeks offshore and two weeks onshore, and 2/3 denotes the level two weeks offshore and three weeks onshore 
 
